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No country has a right to an auto industry. Auto production is 
footloose and can move if conditions don’t suit it anymore. 
With Honda and Ford pull-outs in the UK attributed to a range of 
reasons, and Peugeot warning that a No Deal Brexit will see it shift 
Astra production from the UK to a South European plant (which could 
mean anything south of the UK), fears are mounting that the UK car 
industry is at a tipping-point. 
UK auto has been squeezed by diesel’s demise, falling sales in China 
AND Brexit uncertainty hampering growth – at the same time as the 
need to invest in new technology going forward. 
Investment in UK auto has stalled, down 80% in the last three years 
according to the SMMT, as auto firms sit on their hands given the 
Brexit uncertainty. And the SMMT has again warned that a hard Brexit 
is an ‘existential threat’ to UK auto. 
But could the UK really lose all (or much) of this industry? Our answer 
is yes, and one can look to recent Australian experience by way of 
illustration. 
To do so, we chart the disappearance of the Australian domestic car 
industry, asking whether there are any lessons for the UK as Brexit 
continues to mean uncertainty for UK auto. 
While we focus on Ford ending production in the city of Geelong in the 
state of Victoria (given its primacy as a key employer for the city for 
much of the 20th century), we also note the demise of Mitsubishi in 
Adelaide and Toyota in Melbourne. 
Ford set up in Australia back in 1925 and production started in 
Geelong in that year (with other sites following in Adelaide, Sydney, 
Brisbane and Fremantle), originally producing the famous Model T. 
Domestic production was a necessity to supply the Australian market 
as the Australian Government had banned the import of luxury goods 
(including car bodies) in 1917 during World War One, in order to 
promote domestic industries – and provide new employment for its 
carriage-makers. 
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This was an example of protectionist policy typified by tariffs, which 
was to endure until the 1970s. Post-WWII expansion of the domestic 
industry in 1948 saw the emergence of the rival iconic ‘Holden’ brand 
(an Australian subsidiary of General Motors, known as GMH) that 
soon dominated the domestic market. This prompted Ford to develop 
and produce an Australian version of the US-designed ‘Falcon’ in 
1960 (with successive models also designed in Australia from 1972 
onwards), specifically adapted to cope with the often harsh Australian 
driving conditions. 
The rivalry between these two US-owned subsidiaries (producing big 
cars with six-cylinder and eight-cylinder / V8 engines and petrol 
consumption to match) continued through the sixties, seventies and 
eighties, with the Ford Falcon and the Holden ‘Kingswood’ and then 
‘Commodore’ (an Australian version of the Vauxhall Omega) vying to 
be Australia’s most popular car (even spawning a popular 70s’ 
television sit-com: ‘Kingswood Country’ with the lead character’s line 
to his son, “you’re not taking the Kingswood!”). 
However the 1970s also saw more economical Japanese vehicles 
begin to make inroads into the Australian market (Nissan’s ‘Datsun’ 
brand being an early pioneer) as import tariffs were lowered, with a 
particularly notable tariff cut of 25% in 1973 by the then Whitlam 
Labor[1] government. 
Fierce opposition from domestic producers (notably GMH, which 
stood down 5,000 workers in response) saw this cut reduced to 15% 
but it was notable at the time that the industry, which at its peak 
employed 100,000 people, was seen as being characterised by: 
“too many producers with extensive operations in multiple states, 
resulting in product proliferation, scale inefficiencies, and components 
industries that were forced into exceptionally short production runs, 
together with excessive and costly parts inventories.”[2] 
Added to this, the rising costs of fuel would erode the popularity of the 
large cars such as the Falcon that had underpinned the profitability of 
US-owned subsidiaries in Australia. 
Japanese companies, notably Toyota and Mitsubishi (who took over 
Chrysler operations in Tonsley Park in Adelaide in 1981), also started 
production in Australia. 
However, increased trade liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s (under 
both labour and conservative governments) emphasised measures to 
promote industry ‘competitiveness’ (the 1984 Button Plan of phased 
tariff reductions epitomised this for steel, textiles and automotive[3]). 
This, combined with the emergence of the more cost-competitive 
‘Asian Tiger’ economies would combine to fatally undermine the logic 
of domestic production in Australia as the new century dawned. Car 
production in Australia peaked in the 1970s (475,000 in 1970, which 
ranked Australia tenth in the world at the time) and declined more-or-
less from there on. 
By May 2013, Ford declared its intention to close down remaining 
production plants at Geelong and Broadmeadows (in Melbourne), 
following a cumulative period of successive losses. This in turn had 
been preceded by Mitsubishi’s closure of its Adelaide plant in 
2008.[4] GMH (December 2013) and Toyota (February 2014) followed 
suit, which by the end of 2017 had brought to an end a period of some 
70 years of vehicle production in Australia. 
For Geelong, the ceasing of manufacturing was particularly painful, as 
prior to the closure of Ford, manufacturing had provided (in 2012) 
some 44% of the city’s output. The company – not only directly in 
terms of its own workforce but also in terms of dependent SMEs in the 
supply chain – was the most significant employer of the city’s 
workforce. 
Whilst the Labor (Federal) Government in 2013 had provided a 
package of assistance measures to facilitate adjustment, totalling 
some 66 million Australian dollars, these measures were principally 
focussed on retraining. Subsequent efforts have seen some 
manufacturing return to the site of Ford’s former Geelong operations 
plant in the form of wind turbine assembly by Danish firm Vestas: 
“The VREH will involve investment of approximately $3.5 million and 
directly employ over 20 employees. The project will train hundreds of 
local staff in wind turbine maintenance and see wind turbine 
component assembly in Australia for the first time in over 10 years.” 
However, as noted, the number of staff directly employed is tiny. It 
remains to be seen whether can compensate for the loss of vehicle 
manufacturing in the Geelong region. 
The Australian experience highlights the primacy of the state as 
fostering industry policy and industrialisation. In this sense, the 
availability of abundant, cheap raw materials combined with a 
protectionist state regime that offered incentives such as land 
packages meant domestic production was the only feasible way to 
supply the Australian market. 
Proximity to a large domestic market is also an attraction for car 
producers. Australia did not have a large or integrated domestic 
market, being subject to a historical legacy of varying jurisdictions 
across the different States. 
Furthermore, its trade liberalisation and integration policies with the 
Asia-Pacific meant that it made increasing economic sense for 
companies such as Ford and Toyota to produce in the geographically 
proximate low-cost countries of Indonesia and Thailand and export 
complete vehicles to Australia (this was not helped by a mining boom 
in the 2000s that raised the value of the Australian Dollar and eroded 
export manufacturing competitiveness – a form of ‘Dutch disease’). 
As such, the Australian experience also points to the transformative 
role of the state (at various spatial levels) as a driver of the structural 
changes forces far all too readily solely attributed to ‘globalisation’.[5] 
For Brexit Britain, some points are worth noting. Like Australia in its 
protectionist days, domestic production was feasible when the 
presence of external trade barriers acted as an inhibitor to exporting 
to the UK from a country of origin outside the EU; the location-specific 
advantages of the UK with its flexible market environment inside the 
EU has made it an attractive location to be a production platform 
integrated with the rest of the EU. 
Also striking is how the car industry in the UK, much like Ford was in 
Geelong, is particularly important for middling-sized towns/cities such 
as Coventry (no production but JLR research and development), 
Sunderand (Nissan), Wolverhampton (i4 engine plant), Derby 
(Toyota), and Swindon (Honda) – all in areas with a majority Brexit 
vote. 
Thirdly, in contrast with Australia, other relatively high cost locations 
like Canada (and the UK) have been able to hold onto an automotive 
industry – in part through management and labour working very 
flexibly to get costs down and make sites attractive to 
investment.  That, however, may not be enough. As we’ve noted 
recently, in the case of Vauxhall, a hard-fought battle by management 
and workers to secure investment against international 
competition risks being unwound under a No-Deal Brexit. 
In the event of No deal, the clear incentive for multinationals facing 
customs delays and new tariff and regulatory barriers will be to divest 
from the UK and reinvest elsewhere, as Peugeot is threatening to do. 
Whilst state direction to foster the growth of high-technology sectors 
to compensate for the loss of vehicle production may soften the blow 
of plant closures and consequent job loss, the UK now lacks Regional 
Development Agencies of the sort that prepared for and reacted to the 
MG Rover closure (with associated place-based industrial policy), as 
our previous research has highlighted. 
Australia at least has State governments that are forced to consider 
regional development as part of their raison d’etre) and the need to re-
skill workers to compete in emergent sectors. 
[1] Labor, formally known as the Australian Labor Party, or ALP 
(American spelling convention used). The conservative parties in 
Australia have had various manifestations over the years, 
namely; Free Trade Party, Nationalist Party, United Australia 
Party and Liberal Party, generally as a coalition with the Country 





[4] See: Andrew Beer (2018), ‘The closure of the Australian car 




[5] Beer (2018) argues that this process has been typified by the 
Federal Government in Australia prioritising overall growth and 
competitiveness over regional well-being, with state governments and 
local authorities being left to deal with the “negative consequences of 
economic 
change”.  See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00049182
.2017.1402452 
 
